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 To what extent do early intuitions about ownership depend on cultural and socio-
economic circumstances? We investigated the question by testing reasoning about third party 
ownership conflicts in various groups of three- and five-year-old children (N=176), growing up 
in seven highly contrasted social, economic, and cultural circumstances (urban rich, poor, very 
poor, rural poor, and traditional) spanning three continents. Each child was presented with a 
series of scripts involving two identical dolls fighting over an object of possession. The child had 
to decide who of the two dolls should own the object. Each script enacted various potential 
reasons for attributing ownership: creation, familiarity, first contact, equity, plus a control/neutral 
condition with no suggested reasons. Results show that across cultures, children are significantly 
more consistent and decisive in attributing ownership when one of the protagonists created the 
object. Development between three and five years is more or less pronounced depending on 
culture.  The propensity to split the object in equal halves whenever possible was generally 
higher at certain locations (i.e., China) and quasi-inexistent in others (i.e., Vanuatu and street 
children of Recife). Overall, creation reasons appear to be more primordial and stable across 
cultures than familiarity, relative wealth or first contact. This trend does not correlate with the 
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passing of false belief theory of mind. 
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                               OWNERSHIP REASONING IN CHILDREN OF 7 CULTURES 
Recent cross-cultural research indicates that market integration (i.e. average number of 
calories purchased per capita) and affiliation with a large world religion predict individuals’ 
propensity to be generous as well as their tendency to distribute resources and engage in costly 
punishment (Henrich et al., 2010).  Such findings suggest that socio-economic and cultural 
context could determine much of the ways we tend to see and relate to material possessions: how 
we are inclined to share and distribute justice, how we think of who owns what and why? 
Ethnographies and comparative studies of property rights show how many norms of individual 
ownership may vary across cultures (Barclay, 2005; O’Meara, 1990). From a developmental 
perspective, the question is when and how children start to manifest the individual ownership 
norms of their culture? Alternatively, what kind of early ownership norms might be invariant 
across cultures in child development?   
By the second year, children manifest explicit attachment to particular person (Ainsworth 
et al., 1978) and material things (Faigenbaum, 2005; Ross et al., 2011), becoming vocal and 
explicit about their possession (Tomasello, 1998; Bates, 1990; Rochat, 2011). However, the 
frequency and form of infants’ and toddlers’ early attachment and exclusive control over things 
may vary across cultures. Early attachment to objects or transitional objects (Winnicott, 1953) is 
less prevalent in cultures where the practice is for children to sleep with their parents (Hobara, 
2003).  When asked to split valuable goods with someone else, preschoolers growing up in rural, 
traditional, or small communal living environments tend to be less selfish and more egalitarian 
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(Rochat et al., 2009). They are also less inclined to restore justice by punishing (Robbins & 
Rochat, 2011; see also Henrich et al., 2006 for cross-cultural differences in adults). Cross-
cultural research with young children indicates that, in general, the spontaneous sharing of food 
and the exclusive appropriation of material things among young children may vary across 
cultural contexts and socio-economic circumstances (Birch & Billman, 1986; Rao & Stewart, 
1999; Stewart & McBride-Chang, 2000).  To the extent that there are cultural variations in the 
way children share resources and distribute justice among peers, questions remain whether early 
cultural ways of sharing may also translate in differential early reasoning and “intuitions” about 
who should own what and why. 
In the recent influx of experimental studies on the origins and development of reasoning 
about possession (Ross & Friedman, 2011), entitlement (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 
2013), ownership of ideas (Shaw et al., 2012), ownership transfer (Blake & Harris, 2009; 
Kangiesser et al., 2010), and reasons and intuitions to own (Friedman, 2008; Noles et al., 2012), 
very little exists from a cross-cultural perspective (Rochat, 2014/forthcoming). Existing data 
primarily with Western middle-class preschoolers (but see Faigenbaum, 2005 for an exception) 
suggests that from three years of age, even possibly by two years (Fasig, 2000), young children 
like adults infer the ownership of an object based on a first possession principle (“who had it 
first owns it” principle; see Friedman & Neary, 2008; Friedman, 2008).  By four- to five-years, 
children can infer ownership on the basis of who authorized the use of an object (control of 
permission principle; Neary, Friedman & Burnstein, 2009; Faigenbaum, 2005). More recently, 
studies show that by five years children develop some understanding of grounds for ownership 
transfer (e.g., labor investment, borrowing as opposed to stealing; Blake & Harris, 2009). This 
understanding may even emerge earlier, around three- to four-years, when children are active 
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participants rather than third party observers in the ownership transfer (Kangiesser, Gjersoe, & 
Hood, 2010). 
The few existing studies comparing possessive behaviors in children across cultures 
present a mixed picture of universal and culture specific developments. Furby (1978) performed 
open-ended interviews of five- and ten-year-old children, questioning them about what makes 
somebody own something. Interviewees were North American and Israeli, some living in 
Kibbutz communal organizations, all showing exposure to marked differences “in the degree to 
which personal possession is practiced and encouraged” (Furby, 1978, p. 64).  Furby reports 
two common and putatively universal motives for possession: the control of effects one has on 
objects (sense of efficacy or “effectance motives” in relation to objects) and self-assertiveness 
(self defining motives in relation to others). Furby also finds complex interactions of age, 
gender, culture, as well as object kinds regarding what constitutes possession and determines 
possessive behaviors. Although the right of use and/or control of an object are central aspects of 
what determines possession across cultures for all children, Furby reports that the acquisition 
process of the object was the main determinant of possession only for the youngest (five-year-
old) Israeli children. Overall, the range of meanings and reasons for possessing as opposed to 
not possessing an object increase with age in all three cultures but at significantly different rates 
(Furby, 1978).  
In another rare cross-cultural study that compared one- to three-year-old toddlers growing 
up in different kibbutz, Lakin, Lakin, & Costanzo (1979) observe fewer conflicts over objects 
amongst children raised in total collective care relative to those in daycare. These observations 
suggest that from an early age, a link may exist between the various kinds of cultural practices 
that surround children and their developing attitudes as well as motives to possess (i.e., more or 
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less need for self-assertiveness and claim of ownership; see Keller, 2007). Again, indirectly 
corroborating the effect of culture on young children’s degree of possessiveness, three and five 
year-old preschoolers growing up in diverse small non-Western rural communities around the 
world tend to show a lesser tendency to be greedy and self-maximize when asked to share, 
compared to same age preschoolers of large Western and non-Western urban and industrial 
areas (Rochat et al., 2009).  
 
The present research 
In this research, we considered the extent to which children’s early intuitive reasoning 
about ownership reflects the particular values of their cultural and developmental niche (Super & 
Harkness, 1986) or alternatively, whether there are some universal principles that all children 
develop in independence of their socio-economic and cultural environment. The overarching 
goal was to weigh the extent to which the early development of ownership reasoning varies 
across cultural contexts.   
 In addition to what we know about Western middle class preschoolers regarding the 
principles they use in determining ownership, we considered additional principles that have been 
traditionally called for in political philosophy and the philosophy of law on the determination of 
ownership of an object (Locke, 1689/1996; Rose, 1985) but that have not been considered jointly 
in the perspective of development. These principles include creation (effort and work in creating 
an object, e.g., Kangiesser et al., 2010; Li et al., 2013), first contact (antecedence in seeing or 
touching the object first, e.g., Friedman & Neary, 2008), familiarity (anterior use and habit; e.g., 
Neary, Friedman & Burnstein, 2009; Friedman et al., 2011), and equity (equitable distribution 
between rich and poor; e.g., Zebian & Rochat, 2012). We also compared children’s spontaneous 
 6 
propensity to split an object of contention in half to resolve an ownership conflict between two 
protagonists, whenever the object was divisible. This condition was specifically meant to allow 
children to choose between equal versus exclusive ownership attribution. 
The question of interest here is whether young children (three- to five-year-old 
preschoolers) growing up in environments varying from relative material abundance (rich vs. 
poor), to basic group living arrangements and values (small traditional rural village vs. large 
urban and industrial environments ruled by communist or non-communist capitalism) would 
differ in developing intuitions and early reasoning about ownership.   
As a general working hypothesis, we predicted that there would be differences across 
cultures in relation to some principles, but not others. We expected that the first contact principle 
would be most basic and universal, the least variable principle across cultures compared to 
familiarity, creation, or equity principles. The reasoning was the following. The first possession 
principle appears to be the most pervasive in nature and deeply rooted in evolution, evident even 
in invertebrates (i.e., hermit crab, Arnott & Elwood, 2007). In the perspective of development 
and relative to all the latter principles, the first contact (first possession) principle would be more 
primary because it is directly inferable, linked to concrete appropriative actions by possessors on 
the object (i.e., grabbing and holding). It is therefore less opaque and more concrete compared to 
all the other principles that are relatively more abstract. We reasoned that the other principles 
should be more open to cultural influences. We were agnostic regarding the nature and 
magnitude of these influences in relation to each principle, and therefore did not make any 
specific predictions.  
Because past research indicates that three- to five-year-old children growing up in small 
rural, traditional and collectivistic societies tend to be more equitable in sharing (Rochat et al., 
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2009), we expected the group of Melanesian Ni-Vanuatu children (see description below) to 
show more inclination in resolving the conflict between the two protagonists by spontaneously 
splitting the object in half in the condition where the object was actually splitable (see Method 
below). Finally, we expected a positive correlation between the passing of first order false-belief 
understanding (theory of mind) and children’s reasoning about ownership attribution. Both were 
considered as potential indices of social-cognitive development between the age of three and five 
years. 
The seven cultural sites were spread across three continents and varied along multiple 
dimensions, including demographic (large urban areas vs. semi-urban or small rural regions), 
socio-economic (middle-class vs. poor), and cultural dimensions (individualistic vs. more 
collectivist value systems). The choice of the research sites was in part opportunistic, based on 
possible research collaborations offered to us that provided access to a large variety of socio-
economic and cultural circumstances. Opportunism aside, the choice of the research sites was 
also guided by the working assumption of a contrast between cultures that promote more or less 
values attached to communal living and activities activities, as well as the sharing of more or less 
abundant resources or possessions (Fiske, 1992). Conceptually, for the sake of our general 
research question and while acknowledging limitations and caveats in such distinctions 
(Schwartz, 2013; Omi, 2012), we broadly dichotomized cultures. We distinguisted between 
cultures that nurture interdependence in the child beyond the nuclear family and that focus 
education around greater concerns for others. This would include the smaller traditional, rural, 
subsistence living, and highly collectivist community of Vanuatu, and possibly children 
attending the communist party run preschool in the megalopolis of Shanghai, China. In contrast, 
we compare these cultures to urban industrial cultures that would tend to promote more values 
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attached to individual enhancement where children tend to be educated around greater concerns 
for self-optimization and self-assertiveness, toward individual achievements and control over 
individual possessions. The latter would include the two sites in North America and the three 
sites of Brazil that are modern and urban, where children are highly Westernized but often living 
below poverty levels, including the unschooled “street” children of Recife who get by on their 
own, surviving unsupervised by adults with peers on the street peddling and dealing (Aneci 
Rosa, de Sousa, Borba, & Ebrahim, 1992; Fernandes & Vaughn, 2008). Table 1 summarizes 
each cultural site relative to general environment, socio-economic status, and population 
highlight.  
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Table 1: Brief descriptive of the 7 cultural environments of tested children 
Country Region Setting Environment SES status 
 Population 
 Highlights 
USA 1 Atlanta Private 
daycares 
Urban Middle/High Children of middle 
class 
predominantly 
Caucasian 
suburban families 
 
USA 2 Atlanta Public 
daycares 
Urban Low Inner city African 
American children 
of lower SES 
families 
CHINA Shanghai Communist 
party run 
Daycare 
Urban Middle Children educated 
in a large 
communist party 
run university 
daycare 
 
VANUATU Motalava 
(Banks 
Island, 
Melanesia) 
Village Rural, chief 
system, 
traditional, 
collectivistic 
and egalitarian 
Very Low Children of a 
highly insular 
subsistence living 
village with a 
population of 
approximately1000  
BRAZIL 1 Rio De 
Janeiro 
Private 
Day-care 
Urban Middle/High Upper middle class 
and urban rich 
families 
BRAZIL 2 Rio De 
Janeiro 
Volunteer 
Day-care 
Urban Low Children educated 
in crime infested 
urban and working 
class slum or 
Favela 
BRAZIL 3 Recife Streets Urban Very low Unschooled and 
unsupervised 
children with 
broken, extended 
families surviving 
collectively on the 
streets 
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Method 
Overview 
  We used identical props and procedure to test groups of three- and five-year-old 
preschoolers of seven different cultures defining seven contrasted developmental macro-niches 
along rich-poor and urban-rural dimensions (two sites in the United States, China, Vanuatu, and 
three sites in Brazil; see descriptions below). Each child was tested in five successive 
experimental conditions, all based on the same basic script of two puppets finding an object and 
fighting over its possession. For each condition, the character and situation of the two puppets 
within the basic script was changed to probe the various ownership principles. Following each 
story, the child was asked to decide which of the two puppets owns and should have the object of 
contention. In each experimental condition, we assessed children’s responses as well as the level 
of their confidence in this ownership attribution by looking at the level of consistency of their 
responses to two follow-up questions:  “Who should have it? Could you give it to the doll?” 
Each condition was tested twice in a row, once with an object of possession that is whole and 
indivisible, then again with an object demonstrated to the child as being easily divisible in two 
identical and separable parts. This last condition gave children the possibility to resolve the 
conflict between the two dolls by giving each an equal part of the contentious object of 
possession.   
 
Participants 
 A total of 176 children were tested and included in the final sample (90 females) of seven 
cultures (two sites in the US,China, Vanuatu, three sites in Brazil,). The children were divided 
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into two age groups: 84 three-year olds (ranging from 34-50 months, MSD= 434.2 ) and 92 
five-year olds (ranging from 58-74 months, MSD= 634.1). Table 1 below presents the 
breakdown of participants by culture, age, and gender. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of children tested by age, gender, and cultural site (N = 176). 
 U.S. 
mid-high 
SES  
(N=38) 
U.S.  
low SES 
(N=21) 
China - 
Shanghai 
(N=28) 
Vanuatu - 
Banks 
(N=24) 
Brazil 1 
(mid-high) 
SES) 
(N=24) 
Brazil 2 
(street, poor) 
(N=19) 
 Brazil 3 
(slum, poor) 
 (N= 22) 
 3 yrs 5 yrs 3 yrs 5 yrs 3 yrs 5 yrs 3 yrs 5 yrs 3 yrs 5 yrs 3 yrs 5 yrs 3 yrs 5 yrs 
Female 11 8 7 6 8 7 5 5 3 6 6 6 4 8 
Male 10 9 4 4 6 7 5 9 6 9 4 3 5 5 
N 21 17 11 10 14 14 10 14 9 15 10 9 9 13 
 
Material and Design 
Throughout testing, the child sat across a table from a trained adult female Experimenter 
who was unfamiliar to the child, except in Vanuatu where children were tested by a male adult of 
their small community who was unrelated but known to the child and the only person in the 
village fluent in English. At all locations, the Experimenter was a native speaker in the child’s 
language. Children were tested in their native language in five successive conditions. In each 
condition, the Experimenter presented the child with a story, each time involving two physically 
identical three-inch tall miniature dolls (e.g., playmobil or small hard plastic animals), each 
called by an unfamiliar name of the same length to avoid memory and preference bias; names 
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were well contrasted by the last syllable of their name (e.g., Rooka and Rookee; Coolee and 
Coola etc., see below). Across cultures, the dolls’ names were clearly distinct in the local 
language, and children were sysematically assessed for their comprehension and labeling of the 
protagonists in each script (see precautions and reliabilty section below).  
In each of the five conditions, the story involving the dolls and the follow up three 
ownership questions were repeated twice: first with an object of contention that was intact 
(indivisible) and then with a similar object that was splitable in two equal halves held together by 
a piece of Velcro. In the latter situation, and before the story involving the two dolls was told to 
the child, the experimenter demonstrated twice in front of the child the divisibility of the object 
into identical halves, each time putting the two parts back together via the Velcro attachment 
without any comment,, letting the child do the same if enticed to imitate. 
For each condition, different pairs of identical dolls were used to maintain the child’s 
interest, and to demarcate the successive stories and provide some novelty.  Pairs of dolls were 
randomly assigned to each condition in the intact and splitable object situations. The object of 
contention consisted of small one-inch hard plastic, shiny and colorful toys. Indivisible objects 
included a small bicycle, a small plastic ice cream cone, or a solid colorful plastic block. 
Splitable objects were made of two identical pieces that could be “halved” such as two matching 
cubes or two plastic pizza slices. Different sets of objects were used across research sites, 
depending on availability. At each site, there was a total of five sets of two splitable and 
indivisible objects, each pair assigned to a particular condition. These objects were engaging and 
easily identifyable as valid props and real objects for children of all cultures, even in Vanuatu 
where manufactured toys are rare. Pretend play with makeshift objects is prevalent and a 
common way of playing in all cultures, even in the absence of manufactured toys (Kamei, 2005). 
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All testing sessions were videotaped using a small Canon digital camera for later analysis 
and reliability assessment. The camera rested on a tripod three to five meters away and provided 
an overhead side view of child and experimenter, who faced each other at a table across a 
distance of one to two meters (see Figure 1).    
 
 
Figure 1: Five-year-old being tested on the island of Motalava, Vanuatu.  
 
Scripts and Procedure 
  In five different conditions (with intact, then splitable objects of contention), the 
experimenter presented and enacted with small props an analogous story (basic script) of two 
dolls who were friends that decided to take a walk together and ended up fighting and arguing 
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over an object of possession they found together at the same time or in succession, claiming in 
chorus: “This is mine!... No this is mine!” over the object until they were separated, placed one 
foot apart by the Experimenter with the object of contention placed exactly inbetween. The child 
was then asked three successive questions, always in the same order, that served as our primary 
dependent measures: 1) “Whose object is it?” 2) “Who should have it?” and  3) “Could you give 
it to the doll?”. The child could choose and designate one puppet, or alternatively none or both.  
For the analysis, we considered which doll(s) the child chose in response to each of the 
three questions and how consistent children were in their response to these questions. Based on 
their relative consistency across the three questions, we calculated for each child a confidence 
attribution score (see below). 
Across the five experimental conditions, details of the basic script varied systematically 
in relation to the various background stories of the characters and how the conflict between the 
two puppets ensued: 
 
1) Creation condition: Before the occurrence of the conflict, and after being introduced to 
the two puppets by name and told that they were friends and playmates, the child was 
told by the experimenter that one of the puppet (either “Colee” or “Coola”) painstakingly 
manufactured and created the toy they will eventually find together and that the other did 
not. As with all the stories, the same emphasis was placed on both dolls to avoid bias (see 
appendix for exact script). For later analysis, we reasoned that the target doll who should 
normatively own the object is the creator protagonist. 
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2)  First Contact condition: After being introduced to a new pair of befriended dolls named 
either “Folee” or “Fola”, the Experimeter told the child that they were going to take a 
walk together. Walking a distance from each other, one of the dolls suddenly saw an 
object from afar; the other doll stood closer but did not see it from its vantage point on 
the other side of an opaque barrier. Following the script, the puppet who can see the 
object announces with joy: “I see it!, I see it!”. At this point, the other puppet goes around 
the opaque barrier and grabs the object first as the other doll is still rushing toward it, 
both screaming: “this is mine!” and fighting over the object. The two dolls were then 
separated by the Experimenter who then questioned the child regarding ownership. In 
other words, one puppet saw the object first and the other physically grabbed it first, thus 
testing children’s sensitivity to first visual versus physical (tactile) possession in their 
determination of ownership. For later analysis, we reasoned that the target doll who 
grabbed the object first should normatively own it, based on our hypothesis (i.e., primacy 
of first contact principle)., We thus considered first physical contact as the norm. 
 
3) Familiarity condition: The child was told by the Experimenter that one doll (either 
“Doolee” or “Doola”) lived all its life near the object sitting close to its house and was 
able to see it every morning from its window as it wakes up. The other doll did not. Once 
again, equal attention, sentences, and words were used to describe the context of each 
puppet, controlling for potentially unbalanced focus by the Experimenter. In short, in this 
condition what varied was the initial familiarity of the object by one of doll prior to the 
walk, the simultaneous discovery of the object, and the fight over it. For later analysis, 
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we reasoned that the target puppet which was familiar with the object should normatively 
own it. 
 
4) Neutral (control) condition: The dolls were introduced as friends (“Noolee” and 
“Noola”) who took a walk together until they found simultaneously the object of 
contention and ended up fighting over its possession. No other information was provided 
in the story. For later analysis, we arbitrarily reasoned that the target doll which should 
normatively own it is the one sitting to the left of the child. 
 
5) Rich-Poor Equity Condition: Before the occurrence of the conflict, and after being 
introduced to the two dolls by name and being told that they were friends and playmates, 
the child was told by the Experimenter that one of the dolls (either “Rookee” or “Rooka”) 
was rich and had a lot of toys. The other had none. The rich doll was presented to the 
child surrounded by a collection of five small objects said to be toys belonging to it. The 
poor doll sat on the table with nothing surrounding it. The dolls then walked together, 
discovering the object at the same time and fighting over it before being separated by the 
experimenter. What varied was the initial rich or poor character of the dolls. For later 
analysis, we reasoned that the target doll who should normatively own the object is the 
poor protagonist. 
 
Once again, in all conditions, the Experimenter was careful to devote equal attention and 
phrasing to describe the context of each puppet, controlling for unbalanced focus and potential 
biases.  
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Creation, First Contact, and Familiarity conditions were always presented first in a 
counterbalanced order across the two age groups in each culture. The Neutral control condition 
always preceded the Rich-Poor condition that was presented last to avoid contamination, as it 
was thought to be more emotionally loaded. 
In general, the tested ownership principles rested on different cues or rationales proposed 
to children in their determination of ownership. These cues were multiple (creation, familiarity 
and first contact conditions),  circumstantial (equity condition), or absent (neutral condition). 
Therefore, conditions potentially differ in degrees of abstraction. 
 
False belief  “Theory of Mind” test 
To assess the extent to which children’s development of ownership reasoning relates to 
other well known universal aspects of social-cognitive development, the session ended with each 
child tested in a first order false belief theory of mind task (Wellman et al., 2001). The rationale 
for this additional test was to correlate ownership reasoning with a robust index of socio-
cognitive development documented to emerge across cultures between three and five years 
(Callaghan et al., 2005). This final test involved the experimenter and another unfamiliar adult 
person. In this test, the child and the other adult witnessed the hiding of a ball under one of two 
cups with distinct colors. The adult person then excused herself, saying that she will be right 
back before disappearing into another room. The Experimenter then suggested that the child play 
a trick on the person, secretly changing the hiding location of the ball from one cup to the other.  
The Experimenter helped the child to do so then asked the child: “when she returns, where do 
you think she is going to look for the ball?” After the child guessed, the other adult returned and 
looked for the ball where she last saw it being hidden. The child passed the test if he (or she) 
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guessed right, suspending his (or her) own knowledge and attributing a false belief to the person 
they tricked.  
 
Coding and Analysis: 
 In each condition, children’s ownership attributions for the three questions were coded 
relative to one target doll protagonist (here called the “target” protagonist, or the one aligned 
with the story rationale): the creator in the Creation condition, the one that grabbed the object 
first in the First Contact condition, the one that lived by the object in the Familiarity condition, 
the puppet sitting on the left of the child in the Neutral condition (arbitrary choice), and the poor 
puppet in the Rich-Poor Equity condition.  
Children’s responses to the first question (“whose is it?”) were analyzed independently.  
We considered this direct index of ownership attribution.   
 Based on the remaining two questions (“who should have it” and “could you give it”), we 
further calculated a consistency of attribution score which ranged from 0-2 points. Children were 
categorized as completely inconsistent if for both questions they attributed the object to the non-
target protagonist (score of 0).  Children were partially consistent if they attributed ownership to 
the target protagonist for only one of the questions (score of 1).  Finally, completely consistent 
children attributed ownership to the target protagonist for both questions (score of 2).  
We also analyzed the frequency of children splitting the object in the splitable object 
situations. In our analyses, all of these variables were examined as a function of age, culture, and 
condition. Finally, we assessed the correlation between the passing of the theory of mind false 
belief test performed at the end of the testing session and all of the above dependent measures. 
 19 
Precautions and reliability 
 The video record of 20% of randomly chosen children for each age and culture was re-
coded for reliability by a second independent coder. Both coders were unaware of the specific 
hypotheses. Collapsed across culture, inter-rater reliability agreement for all measures, including 
the false belief theory of mind test, was high (overall kappa = .972; k = .980, .953, .988, .938, 
and .873 for the creation, first contact, familiarity, equity, and neutral conditions, respectively). 
 The Experimenter was a native speaker of the local language where children were tested 
and was also fluent either in English or French for training and back translation of the procedure 
and protocol.  The basic procedure and the different scripts corresponding to each condition were 
translated into the local language and back translated in English or French (Vanuatu) under the 
close supervision of the first author who trained local assistants for testing. Testing sessions at all 
locations but Vanuatu were videotaped and systematically checked during coding for any 
language, labeling, or experimental errors. Note that in all instances, Experimenters were closely 
supervised by the first author who was present for most testing, in particular all testing of the 
children in Vanuatu and at the three sites in Brazil. In Vanuatu, because of a camera malfunction, 
in lieu of video re-coding for reliability, for each question, the first author systematically entered 
the child’s response on the coding sheet and then confirmed this entry with the Experimenter’s 
report of the child’s answer. From that sample and on this stringent basis, all data included had 
100% reliability.  
 In each condition, after the preliminary story was told, the child’s comprehension of the 
story was systematically probed by the Experimenter who asked the questions about the two 
characters (e.g., “Who created the object? Who did not? Who saw it first? Who has already a lot 
of objects” etc.) and asked children to respond to these prompts using the distinct nicknames of 
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the dolls. The session proceeded only when children were unambiguous in their answers to the 
Experimenter’s prompts, confirming their comprehension of the distinct character and actions of 
the dolls in each story. Testing was prematurely ended for seven children who did not correctly 
answer the prompts, representing an overall attrition rate of  3.8%  (four three-year-olds), 
including two children in the US and one in each of the other five sites). 
  
Results 
 Data were analyzed based (1) on children’s answers to the first question (“whose object is 
it?”), and the consistency of attribution score described previously. We also considered (2) the 
frequency of splitting the object in the “splitable object” situation.  In the analyses that follow, 
we examined each of these dependent measures as a function of age, culture, and condition. 
Results of the false belief theory of mind test (pass or fail) for the children at both ages were also 
considered (3) as being correlated with the ownership attribution and consistency of attribution 
measures. 
 
 1) First ownership attribution (“Whose object is it?”) and consistency score. 
In relation to the first intact object situation, we analyzed the proportion of children who in 
their attribution of ownership followed the principle emphasized by the story (creation, first 
contact, familiarity, or inequity), using the left puppet in the neutral control condition (see 
method above). We also considered whether these initial ownership attributions were consistent 
with children’s responses to the remaining questions (“Who should have it?” and “Could you 
give it to the doll?”, see description of the consistency of attribution score in the Method above). 
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Ownership attribution was assessed in a series of hierarchical logistic regressions. 
Hierarchical (multilevel) logistic models are appropriate for research designs in which non-
continuous data are organized in a nested fashion (e.g., age groups within cultures).  These 
models adjust for the possibility that individual participants may share characteristics (not 
measured directly in the study, such as SES or family experience) that would in turn make it 
unlikely for their responses or behaviors to be independent (Gelman & Hill, 2006; Jaeger, 2008). 
Age was included as a fixed effect, culture was treated as a random effect, and models included 
random intercepts and random slopes. Analyses were run using the R-statistical platform using 
the generalized linear mixed model package. Per our hypotheses, competing models were not 
tested, but best fit statistics are reported using the logliklihood (-2LL) ratio chi-square statistic 
comparing each model to its releveant null model. Where appropriate as follow-ups to significant 
interactions, we ran two-tailed Fisher’s exact tests to compare three- and five-year-olds within 
each culture, as well as two-tail binomial tests with Hochberg corrections to compare each 
sample to chance. All reported binomial tests include this adjustment for multiple comparisons, 
which controls for false discovery rate rather than the overall alpha level (Benjamini & 
Hochberg, 1995; Huang & Hsu, 2007). 
Results yielded a significant three-way interaction of condition, culture, and age for 
ownership attribution (z = 2.399, p = .017, N = 176; model fit: -2LL chi-square = 116.12, df = 
17, p < .01). Follow-up analyses assessed whether children’s ownership attribution varied across 
condition, independent of age and culture.  Regarding ownership attribution, results yielded a 
significant effect of condition (z = 3.62,  p < .001, N = 176; model fit: -2LL chi-square = 81.14, 
df = 4, p < .001).  Children tended to attribute ownership to the protagonist aligned with the story 
rationale significantly more often in the Creation (83.6%) and Familiarity (75.8%) conditions, 
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and to a lesser extent the Equity condition (66.0%).  In contrast, children were less cohesive in 
their ownership attribution in the First Contact (47.6%) and Neutral (53.4%) conditions. These 
findings suggest that across age and culture, creation and familiarity may be more privileged 
criteria in determining ownership than other rationales such as first contact, in which the 
principle of ownership may be more ambiguous. 
 
Figure 2.  Percent of children who attribute ownership to the protagonist considered aligned with 
the story rationale as a function of age, condition, and culture.  Horizontal line represents chance.  
Asterisks denote significant departures from chance based on two-tail binomial tests with 
Hochberg corrections for multiple comparisons: * p < .05, ** p<.01 
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In a series of further analyses we examined the interaction of age and culture for each 
Condition independently. Figure 2 above presents the graphic representations of the percent of 
children whose ownership attribution was aligned with the story rationale, as a function of age 
and culture. We describe the results for each condition separately. 
 
For the Creation condition, across cultures, five but not three-year-olds are uniform in 
significantly attributing ownership of the object of contention to the puppet that created it. 
Hierarchical logistic regression yielded a significant interaction of age and culture, z = 2.86, p = 
.004, N = 175 (model fit: -2LL chi-square = 29.18, df = 13, p = .006). The majority of three-
year-olds across culture tended to be at chance, with the exception of children from USA 1 
(middle-class; 85.7%) and China (85.0%) who were already significantly above chance in 
attributing ownership to the creator (binomial tests:   p < .001 and p = .036, respectively). Across 
cultures, five-year-olds tended to be either significantly above chance in chosing the creator, 
including Brazil 1 (100%), USA 1 (94.1%), China (92.9%) and USA 2 (90.0%; binomial tests: p 
< .001, < .001, .007, and .049, respectively) or marginally above chance in choosing the creator, 
including Brazil 2 (83.3%), Brazil 3 (88.9%), and Vanuatu (78.6) (binomial tests: p = .068, .068, 
and .088, respectively).  Developmentally, this tendency for more five-year-olds to attribute 
ownership to the creator than three-year-olds was significant for Brazil 1 (Fisher’s exact tests: p 
= .003), or marginal for Brazil 2 and 3 (p = .080, and .091, respectively). 
Analysis of the correlation between children’s ownership attribution (the first question) and 
their consistency regarding this attribution (e.g., responses to the other two questions) yielded 
highly significant results (rs174 = .682, p<.001). This indicates that regardless of age and culture, 
 24 
attribution to the creator puppet is associated with consistency across the three questions, with 
84.4% of all children attributing ownership to the same protagonist across all questions. 
 
In the First Contact condition, hierarchical logistic regression yielded no significant 
predictors of age or culture regarding the ownership attribution question (first question). Across 
age and culture, children tended to be at chance. However, across ages and cultures, ownership 
attribution and consistent attribution were significantly correlated, rs174 = .654, p < .01. Children 
who attributed ownership to the doll who saw it first tended to be consistent across the three 
questions, (70.4% of  children). Inversely, 76.9% of children attributing ownership to the  puppet 
that grabbed it first did not show such consistency across the three questions. Results thus 
indicate that attribution to the protagonist who saw it first was associated with signs of greater 
confidence or decisiveness. 
 
In the Familiarity condition, hierarchical logistic regression yielded a significant interaction 
of age and culture (z = 2.930, p = .003, N = 173; model fit: -2LL chi-square = 22.87, df = 13, p = 
.043) for the first ownership attribution question. Across all cultures, three-year-olds tended to be 
at chance in their ownership attribution.  Amongst five-year-olds we observed either a significant 
trend (USA 1: 87.5%) or marginal trend (USA 2: 90.0% and Vanuatu: 84.6%) to attribute 
ownership to the protagonist most familiar with the object (binomial tests: p = .028, .091, and 
.098, respectively).  Developmentally, this tendency for more five-year-olds than three-year-olds 
to attribute ownership to the familiar protagonist was significant for Vanuatu (Fisher’s exact test: 
p = .028), marginal for Brazil 1, and Brazil 2  (Fisher’s exact tests: p = .091 and .051, 
respectively). 
 25 
We found no significant associations between ownership attribution and consistency of 
attribution across questions, rs174 = .092, p = .230. Although a majority of children (70.7% 
collapsed across age and culture) attributed ownership to the familiar protagonist, these children 
did not necessarily remain consistent in their attribution for the remaining two questions. The 
consistency across the three questions in the familiarity condition appears to be low. 
 
In the Rich/Poor Equity Condition,  results yielded a marginal effect of culture only (z = 
1.67, p = .094, N = 174; model fit: -2LL chi-square = 26.49, df = 13, p = .015).   In follow-up 
analyses of this effect, only five year olds in USA 1 (85.7%) and five year olds in China (85.7%) 
tend to be either significantly or maginally above chance in attributing ownership to the poor 
puppet (p = .028 and .091 respectively). It thus appears that only these children show signs of a 
sensitivity toward rich/poor distinction. Regarding development, only Chinese children show a 
significant age effect and are more likely to attribute ownership to the poor protagonist between 
three (42.9%) and five (85.7%) years (Fisher’s exact test: p=.023).  
Ownership attribution and relative consistency across questions were significantly 
correlated (rs174 = .806, p < .001).  Across age and culture, when the child attributes ownership 
to the poor puppet, they do so consistently across the three questions (90.4 %), but not when they 
attribute it to the rich puppet, as 80.0% of those children demonstrate inconsistency across the 
three questions. In short, overall, when children attributed ownership to the poor puppet, they 
tended to do so with more confidence and decisiveness, showing less consistency when 
attributing ownership to the rich puppet. 
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In the Neutral (Control) condition, and as would be expected, analyses yielded no significant 
main effects or interactions of culture and age. The proportion of all children across cultures and 
at both ages are at chance in their first question ownership attribution (see Figure 2). As would 
be expected in this control condition where no obvious ownership rationale was given to the 
child, the correlation between ownership attribution and consistency of attribution across 
questions yielded no significant association (rs176 =-.059, p = .495). This latter result 
demonstrates that children tended to be inconsistentt and at chance in their responses.  
 
2) Frequency of splitting the object 
 For each condition, in the situation where the object was splitable, we noted the number 
of children who spontaneously split the object to distribute each half to either doll.  This binary 
variable was used as the dependent measure in a hierarchical logistic regression factoring age, 
culture, and condition (model fit: -2LL chi-square = 136.02, df = 17, p < .001).  Analysis yielded 
no interactions, but a significant main effect of condition (z = 8.55, p < .001, N = 176) and 
culture (z = 4.005, p < .001, N = 176), with no significant age effect. Children split the object 
significantly more often in the neutral condition (32%) compared to all the other conditions 
(Creation: 19.1%; First Contact: 20.6%; Familiarity: 17.5%; Equity: 21.8%; p < .05 for all 
contrasts between the Neutral condition and each of the other conditions based on McNemar-
Bowker tests). It appears that in the absence of any explicit rationale to attribute ownership, 
children as a whole tend to be more inclined to split the object when divisible. 
 As seen in Figure 3, the Chinese children drive the significant main effect of culture, 42% 
of them splitting the object at least once.  Collapsed across conditions and compared to all the 
other cultures, Chinese children demonstrate either a significantly greater tendency toward 
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splitting compared to all the other cultures (all p < .05 based on Fisher’s exact tests comparing 
China to each other culture). Ni-Vanuatu children and Brazil 3 street children showed a 
significant absence of object splitting across conditions (3.4% and 5.4% respectively). These two 
groups of children were significantly less inclined to split relative to all other cultures (all p < .01 
based on binomial tests). 
 
Figure 3.  Percentage of children who spontaneously split the object, across the seven cultures 
and five conditions when the object was splitable.  
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3) False belief Theory of Mind Test 
  Overall, across culture a significantly greater proportion of five-year-olds (72.7%) passed 
the false belief test compared to three- year-olds (24.7%). These results did not vary across 
samples and uphold the universal (transcultural) development of false belief understanding 
between three- and five-years that does indeed appear to prevail across cultures (Callaghan et al., 
2005).  
 We examined whether children’s attribution of ownership in each of the five conditions 
correlated with this robust index of social-cognitive development. For each condition separately 
and collapsed across cultures, we correlated children’s performance on the false belief task (pass 
or fail) with their ownership attribution (e.g., attributing ownership to the target protagonist or 
not) for each age group independently. Results yielded no significant associations for any of the 
conditions for either age group (p > .05 for all rs tests).  Spearman correlations also yielded no 
link between false belief performance and children’s propensity to split the object when it was 
possible.  Contra predictions, these findings suggest that passing of the false belief task is not 
associated with stronger intuitions of ownership attribution. 
 
Discussion 
Recent surveys indicate that 80% of the world’s population lives on a family income of 
less than $6,000 a year, with half of the world’s population living on an average of two dollars a 
day. Of the global worldwide income distribution, 90% of people from rich industrial European, 
North American and Asian (OCDE) countries are at the top 20%. In the meantime, half of the 
sub-Saharan African population lies at the bottom 20% of the wealth distribution (Kent & Haub, 
2005; United Nations Developmental Programme (UNDP), 2006).   
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In this global context, the circumstantial inheritance of children is stunningly varied. In 
straightforward and measurable terms, economical disparities of children continue to be large, 
growing even larger. In poor circumstances, one in five children do not finish primary school 
education and only half partake to secondary education programs that typically entail costly fees 
and much sacrifice to poor families (UNDP, 2006). Such disparity continues to be the global 
situation of children in the world, yet what we know about their development is primarily 
informed by the testing of a selected sample of middle class Western children of European 
descent or “WEIRD” populations (Henrich et al., 2010) from which universal features of 
development are induced as norms (Rozin, 2006).  
This dominant perspective tends to neglect questions regarding the relative depth of 
impact circumstantial inheritance of children might have in the shaping of their values and the 
development of their social sentiments. Here we asked specifically whether highly variable 
developmental contexts might shape and eventually predict the way young children, in the 
preschool years, develop particular intuitions about ownership of material possessions and the 
sharing of resources. In measurable terms, economical disparity determines issues regarding 
health and hygiene, life expectancy, education, but also violence, gender roles, and political 
participation, i.e., the relative “social toxicity” of the child’s environment. An urgent, yet 
neglected question for cognitive psychologists is what role such varied circumstances play in 
shaping children’s intuitions and expectations about their environment, in particular how 
resources are and should be distributed. 
 It is with this larger issue in mind that we compared three and five-year-olds’ reasoning 
about ownership, from rich and poor regions of the world spanning three continents and 
corresponding to socio-cultural environments that we presumed could put various emphasis on 
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individual possession, owning, and sharing.  
In the context of our possession scripts, we found that the first contact principle did not 
stick out as basic across cultures and age, contrary to what we expected. Rather, results suggest 
that it was harder for children to pick up and decide whether the protagonist who saw or 
alternatively grabbed the object first should own the object. Across cultures, in this condition 
children’s ownership attribution appears to be at chance with no mark of increase of confidence 
with age. Contrary to what we hypothesized, the results in the first contact condition are most 
closely related to the chance results found in the neutral/control condition where the script 
provided no rational cues to the child. Children may have perceived first possession in both 
protagonists (visual and tactile first possessions), and therefore had difficulty deciding which one 
was most relevant. This possibility is most likely in view of existing research demonstrating the 
importance of the first possession principle as primary heuristic in ownership attribution already 
by two- to three-years of age (Friedman & Neary, 2008). Different results might have been 
obtained with a script providing better contrast between seeing as opposed to grabbing the object 
first, as well as counterbalancing the order of the comprehension questions (who saw it first and 
who grabbed it first prompts that were always in the same order in the present study, see 
appendix). The fact that a comparable proportion of children across cultures attributed the object 
to either puppet might suggest that the visual or tactile precedence was used interchangeably as 
rationale for ownership attribution. However, we found a significantly greater consistency across 
the three questions when the child attributed ownership to the puppet that saw rather than 
grabbed the object first. We found less confidence associated with the decision to attribute 
ownership to the puppet that grabbed the object first. The reasons are difficult to interpret. 
Of all the tested principles of early ownership attribution, creation appears to be the most 
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basic and universal. Across cultures, by five years children tended to be above chance in 
attributing ownership to the puppet that labored to create the contentious object. Children’s 
ownership attribution in this condition also tended to be highly consistent across the three 
ownership questions following each script. In the context of our study, the creation principle 
sticks out as generalizing to children of all cultures, particularly by five years of age, with the 
exception of three-year-old middle class North American and Chinese children who already 
show a significant trend (see Figure 2). Note that in the Creation condition, creating the object 
presumes manipulation, therefore also first possession. It also implies greater familiarity with the 
object.  It is difficult to untangle each and therefore this confound could have a cumulative cue 
effect accounting for children’s robust ownership intuition based on this principle across 
cultures. 
We confirm that between three- and five-years of age there is a synchrony across cultures 
in the onset of mental state reasoning measured by third party false belief understanding 
(Callaghan et al., 2005). However, and contrary to what was predicted, our results do not 
demonstrate that such development correlates with young children’s ownership attribution. The 
lack of clear evidence between passing the false belief task and ownership attribution in any of 
the conditions corroborate previous cross-cultural findings with same-age children regarding 
fairness in resource distribution (Rochat et al., 2009). This lack of correlation suggests that 
ownership reasoning, like children’s sense of fairness, would develop in relative independence of 
the ability to attribute mental states to others. This observation indicates that the development of 
ownership reasoning in children is not either derivative or strictly parallel to the known general 
and universal (transcultural) development of theory of mind. If not linked to theory of mind, 
further research is needed to probe what could be the general socio-cognitive precursors of 
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ownership reasoning in children. 
In relation to the rich/poor equity condition, only middle class North American and 
Chinese five-year-olds tended to be above chance in attributing ownership to the poor puppet 
(see Figure 2). This is arguably the most interesting cross-cultural variation we found, contra our 
predictions. Overall, however, it is interesting to note that attribution to the poor protagonist 
tended to be associated with more confidence and reliability across the three ownership questions 
considering all tested children with age and culture collapsed. Independently of culture, those 
children who chose to attribute ownership to the poor puppet did so with significantly more 
confidence, although as a whole, children were not above chance in their decision. These results 
might suggest that the values of equity are differentially promoted and enacted by children of 
these cultures. We predicted similar trends in Ni-Vanuatu children based on their egalitarian, 
small scale and traditional rural culture, but also based as previous research (Rochat et al., 2009). 
The lack of confirmatory findings demonstrates that predictions based on gross cultural 
distinctions are difficult and rarely straightforward. The nature and meanings of cultural factors 
can only be established a-posteriori, always in need of further refinement and measuring tasks. 
But those factors exist, the question is how to capture and operationalize them (Schwartz, 2013; 
Omi, 2012; Keller, 2007). In general, our data point to some cultural clustering around 
nationality, in particular between the two cohorts in the US and the three cohorts in Brazil, all 
tending to show comparable developmental data. What underlies such similarities is elusive. It 
might include language, cultural ways of adult behavior toward children (Lancy, 2008) as well as 
many other factors that appear to transcend economical disparities among these children.  
The marginal tendency of five-year-old Chinese children to abide to the equity principle 
by attributing ownership of the object to the poor protagonist is upheld by the fact that they are 
 33 
also the only group among all the tested children who show some systematic tendency in 
splitting the object of contention in two equal halves whenever the object was splitable. Unlike 
the other children, Chinese preschoolers tended to take advantage of the object affordances in 
this equitable solution, overriding the rationale provided in the script to favor one of the two 
protagonists. They demonstrated a uniquely strong egalitarian bend. In general, however, 
children of all cultures tended to split the object significantly more in the Neutral/control 
condition compared to all the other, suggesting that rationales provided by the scripts did 
override such an egalitarian propensity. In other words, in the absence of any explicit rationale to 
attribute ownership, children as a whole tend to split the object more. The cardinal cross-cultural 
difference is that in our study, this egalitarian propensity was significantly more accentuated in 
Chinese children. What is most unexpected, even contradictory in relation to our original 
intuitions, is the fact that Ni-Vanuatu children, along with the street children of Recife, were 
those who showed a significantly lesser trend in splitting the object in two equal halves. In other 
words, splitting was the least common in children of the two poorest groups, cohorts that 
presumably experience enhanced group intimacy in their rural, small-scale village life (Vanuatu) 
or peer solidarity while surviving on the streets (Recife) (see Aneci et al., 1992). It is doubtful 
that these children did not detect that the object could be split. The divisibility of the object into 
two identical halves was modeled before all scripts, each time the experimenter detaching then 
putting the two parts back together via the Velcro attachment (see Method). We interpret these 
findings as expressions of different normative “stem” values promoted in these cultures, 
particularly in Chinese and Ni-Vanuatu culture. We remain more agnostic in relation to the street 
children of Recife. In the Chinese communist preschool where we tested children, collective 
learning and sharing is explicitly taught to the children who spend most of their school days in 
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collaborative tasks including learning and even the cooking of food. Sharing and splitting things 
is a premium in the preschool culture from the third year. In contrast, and based on our own 
observations during testing of all of the Ni-Vanuatu children, we attribute their striking absence 
of spontaneous splitting of the object of contention to the fact that these children would not dare 
transforming or breaking an object provided to them by an adult, here a trained villager. In the 
Ni-Vanuatu, Melanesian culture, the value of respect and obedience toward the adult is an utmost 
premium children behaving accordingly from the outset. This interpretation is corroborated by 
our informants at this site supporting our idea that Ni-Vanuatu children where inhibited in the 
splitting of the object avoiding the transformation and potential deterioration of an object given 
by an adult authority, particularly in a public context with another adult observing what the child 
might do. Relation to adult authority is a serious issue in cross-cultural studies of children and it 
would always be advisable to study children as they interact spontaneously on their own or 
among peers. More research should pursue such effort in future investigations of possession in 
children across cultures.  
 In conclusion, despite a strong universal expression of the creation principle (as might 
have been predicted by John Locke), our data reveal some interactions between age, condition, 
and culture. They point to the importance of considering the circumstantial inheritances of 
children, including material inequality and the larger social organization surrounding them. From 
their socio-cultural circumstances, children inherit particular normative values that calibrate the 
development of their social reasoning. Our data show specifically that these circumstances can 
potentially shape the content of children’s early ownership reasoning and their understanding of 
personal possession. It is also reasonable to think that such circumstances could shape how 
children eventually integrate consensual views and sentiments about private property. Views and 
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sentiments about property do indeed vary in nontrivial ways across ages and cultures, as multiple 
ethnographic, cultural anthropological and other comparative law studies show. The data 
presented here remind us how much culture calibrates the content of children’s early social and 
cognitive development. It reminds us of the importance of taking context seriously, particularly 
when considering child development and the origin of ownership understanding. 
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APPENDIX: 
CONDITION SCRIPTS  
 
 “I’m going to tell you stories. These stories are about two dolls such as these.” [Show them a 
pair of identical dolls and let the child get involved manipulating them]. “Are you ready to play 
with me? Yes? So here is the game: I want you to listen carefully to the story and then I will ask 
you a few questions, ok? Do you understand?” [Once the child says yes, and appears captivated 
and excited, the Experimenter proceeds.]  
 
Condition 1: CREATION 
 “This is Coola, and this is Coolee. They are good friends. Which one is Coola? Which one is 
Coolee? Good. I want to tell you about Coolee. Coolee loves to build things. He built this toy. He 
spent all day painting it and building this toy and trying it out. But look at Coola. He doesn’t 
build toys. He doesn’t like to paint. He just likes to play with toys like this one. One day Coolee 
and Coola decide to go for a walk and see the toy that Coolee built. They both run toward the toy 
at the same time and grabbed it at the same time and they say “This is mine! This is mine! No 
this is mine! No this is mine!….[back and forth] and they began to fight over the toy [The 
experimenter mimics the scene with the dolls and the toy in-between.]. Coolee built the toy and 
Coola did not build the toy. Who built the toy? Who did not?” 
 
Once the story is told and the child identified correctly each of the protagonist dolls (Coola and 
Colee with their specific character in the story), the Experimenter places the two dolls down on 
the table with the object of contention in the middle, at equidistance (50 cm apart). Then the 
child is asked 3 questions carefully recorded on the coding sheet: Whose toy is it? Who should 
have it? Could you give the toy to the doll? (behavioral response). 
 
The story is then repeated with a splitable object of contention. Before telling the exact same 
story again, the Experimenter demonstrates how the toy object can be separated in two halves 
via Velcro or Lego fitting attachment, then putting the two halves back together, letting the child 
do the same if enticed to imitate. Questions 1-3 are then asked and responses recorded. Note that 
this repetition is standard procedure in all the following conditions. 
 
Condition 2: FIRST CONTACT 
 
“This is Fooma, and this is Foomee. They are good friends. Which one is Fooma? Which one is 
Foomee? Good. Foomee and Fooma go for a walk and are walking together but they are far 
apart. There was a toy hiding behind a tree [object prop standing for the tree] . All of a sudden, 
from far away, Foomee could see the toy. He looked up and says ‘I see a toy! I see a toy! Over 
there behind the tree!” Fooma heard Foomee. He did not see it but was closer to the tree so he 
got the toy first. He grabed it while Foomee was still rushing toward it. Foomee ran and they 
both grab the toy screaming back and forth ‘This is mine! No this is mine! No this is mine!” and 
they began to fight over the toy…”. [The Experimenter mimics the scene with the dolls and the 
toy in-between, then states]: “Foomee saw the toy first, but Fooma got there first and grab it first. 
Who saw it first? Who grabbed it first?” Once the story is told and the child identified correctly 
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each of the protagonist dolls (Foomee and Fooma) with their specific character in the story, the 
Experimenter asked the three questions: Whose toy is it? Who should have it? Could you give the 
toy to the doll?  
Condition 3: FAMILIARITY 
 
“This is Poolee and this is Poola. They are good friends. Which one is Poolee? Which one is 
Poola? Poolee lives close to this toy-object and can see it from his bed everyday when he wakes 
up. Every morning Poolee wakes up and looks at this object, and is very close to it. But Poola 
lives far from this object; he lives all the way down in another house, and cannot see it every day 
from his bed, it is not close to his house. One day Poolee and Poola go for a walk and found the 
toy and grabbed it at the same time screaming back and forth ‘This is mine! No this is mine! No 
this is mine!’ and they began to fight over the toy…” [The Experimenter mimics the scene with 
the dolls and the toy in-between, then states]: “Poolee lives very close to this object, but Poola 
lives far away and has never seen it. Who lives very close to the toy? Who lives far away?” Once 
the story is told and the child identified correctly each of the protagonist dolls (Poolee and 
Poola) with their specific character in the story, the Experimenter asked the three questions: 
Whose toy is it? Who should have it? Could you give the toy to the doll?  
 
Condition 4: NEUTRAL (Control) 
 
“This is Noomee and this is Nooma. They are good friends. Which one is Noomee? Which one is 
Nooma? One day Noomee and Nooma go for a walk and found the object and they both rushed 
to grab it at the same time and scream back and forth ‘This is mine! No this is mine! No this is 
mine!’ [back and forth] and they began to fight over the toy…” [The Experimenter mimics the 
scene with the dolls and the toy in-between then states]: “Noomee and Nooma saw and grabbed 
the toy at the same time.” Once the story is told and the child identifies correctly each of the 
protagonist dolls (Noomee and Nooma), the Experimenter asks the three questions. 
 
Condition 5: EQUITY (Rich/Poor) 
 
“This is Rooka and this is Rookee. They are good friends. Which one is Rooka? Which one is 
Rookee? Rooka is very rich, he has a lot of toys [Experimenter places 5 small object described 
as toys next to Rooka]. He sleeps with plenty of toys all around him and plays all the time with 
many toys. Rookee is different.  He doesn’t have any toys so every day he just plays by himself 
in his house. Who has a lot of toys? Who has no toys? One day Rooka and Rookee go for a walk. 
In the middle of a field as they are walking side by side they see a toy at the same time and they 
run up and at the same time they grab it, screaming back and forth “this is mine! No this is mine! 
No this is mine!” and they began to fight over the toy…” [The experimenter mimics the scene 
with the dolls and the toy in-between. Then states]: “Rooka and Rookee saw and grabbed the toy 
at the same time.” [The Experimenter mimics the scene with the dolls and the toy in-between, 
then states]: “Rooka has a lot of toys and Rookee does not have a lot of toys. Who has a lot of 
toys? Who does not?” Once the story is told and the child identified correctly each of the 
protagonist dolls (Rookee and Rooka) with their specific character in the story, the Experimenter 
asked the three questions: Whose toy is it? Who should have it? Could you give the toy to the 
doll?  
